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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Quentin Miller pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 
crack cocaine. After this Court reviewed the voluntariness 
of Miller's plea and affirmed his sentence on direct appeal, 
he filed two pro se post-conviction motions in the District 
Court challenging the indictment underlying his conviction. 
The District Court, acting sua sponte, recharacterized 
Miller's ineptly drafted motions as a single 28 U.S.C. S 2255 
motion and dismissed Miller's claims on their merits. 
 
This kind of recharacterization poses a novel problem of 
judicial administration. The Antiterrorism Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA) bars federal prisoners from attacking 
their convictions through second or successive habeas 
corpus petitions except in very limited circumstances. See 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title I, S 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220 
(1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. S 2255 (West Supp. 1999). 
Many pro se inmate petitioners are frequent filers of 
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inartfully drafted post-conviction motions. Over the years, 
district courts have commonly recharacterized such pro se 
post-conviction motions as S 2255 motions (the statutory 
means by which federal prisoners attack their sentences on 
collateral review). This practice developed both for 
efficiency's sake and out of a sense of fairness to pro se 
petitioners, whose claims are construed quite liberally. 
Under the aegis of AEDPA, however, with its sharp 
limitation on second or successive petitions, if a district 
court recharacterizes a pro se petitioner's poorly drafted 
post-conviction motion as a S 2255 petition and dismisses 
the motion on its merits, the petitioner is effectively barred 
from later filing a full-fledged collateral attack upon his 
conviction. Thus, under AEDPA, the practice of liberal 
recharacterization that once opened the doors of the federal 
courts to pro se litigants now threatens unintentionally to 
close them shut. 
 
Following the lead of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, see Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582 (2d Cir. 
1998), we hold that district courts must first take certain 
prophylactic measures before recharacterizing a pro se 
petitioner's post-conviction motion as a S 2255 motion or 
ruling on a S 2255 motion denominated as such. More 
specifically, we prescribe that upon receipt of a pro se 
pleading challenging an inmate's conviction or 
incarceration--whether styled as a S 2255 motion or 
not--district courts should issue a form notice to the 
petitioner regarding the effect of such a pleading in light of 
AEDPA. This communication should advise the petitioner 
that he can (1) have his motion ruled upon as filed; (2) have 
his motion recharacterized as a S 2255 motion and heard as 
such, but lose his ability to file a second or successive 
petitions absent certification by the court of appeals; or (3) 
withdraw his petition and file one all-inclusiveS 2255 
petition within the one-year statutory period prescribed by 
AEDPA in S 2255. 
 
Since the District Court did not give Miller notification of 
this nature, we will set aside its decision to recharacterize 
his two post-conviction motions, vacate its order of 
dismissal, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 




Miller participated in a conspiracy to transport crack 
cocaine from Philadelphia to York, Pennsylvania. A grand 
jury returned a two-count indictment against him: one 
count for distributing in excess of fifty grams of crack 
cocaine, 21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), and one count 
for conspiring to distribute in excess of fifty grams of crack 
cocaine, 21 U.S.C. S 846. Miller, assisted by counsel, 
entered into a plea agreement with the government with 
respect to the conspiracy charge. 
 
Unhappy with the calculation of his sentence in the 
presentence report, Miller, acting pro se, filed a letter with 
the District Court in an attempt to withdraw his guilty plea 
before sentencing. He asserted that his attorney had failed 
to warn him that he would be treated as a career offender. 
The District Court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing 
on this issue and denied Miller's motion to withdraw his 
plea. Miller appealed to this court, challenging the District 
Court's refusal to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, 
which he claimed was involuntary because uninformed. In 
a not-for-publication memorandum opinion, we rejected 
Miller's argument. See United States v. Miller, No. 96-7610 
(3d Cir. June 16, 1997). 
 
Shortly after this Court's judgment, Miller, again acting 
pro se, filed two post-conviction motions with the District 
Court. The first motion requested the dismissal of the 
underlying indictment, alleging that the prosecutor 
knowingly used perjured testimony before the grand jury. 
The second filing was a motion for a new trial under Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 33, which was apparently based on the same 
allegation of perjured testimony. As they were styled, 
Miller's two motions were untimely. A motion for a new trial 
and a motion to dismiss an indictment cannot be lodged 
after the defendant has pled guilty and appealed that 
conviction. The District Court, therefore, treated Miller's 
"combined motions" as "really just one motion under 28 
U.S.C. S 2255 to vacate the defendant's sentence," and 
rejected them on their merits. [District Court's 8/20/97 
Order at 1, reprinted in Appendix II at 29.] 
 
Miller again sought to appeal. He argued in his 
Application for a Certificate of Appealability and Brief in 
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Support that the indictment against him was based on 
perjured testimony and that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear his case. More importantly, he also 
asserted that "the district court construing the motion filed 
as a S 2255 motion denude[d] appellant of his right to file 
a S 2255 motion to raise other viable issues that are 
substantive in his case." [Application for a Certificate of 
Appealability, filed 9/25/97, at 1, P 4.] He requested, 
 
       if this court fail [sic] to reach the merits of the denial 
       of the motion below, that the court will "REVERSE" the 
       lower court's order construing the motion filed as a 
       S 2255 motion and allow appellant the opportunity to 
       file a proper S 2255 motion as of right to raise the 
       viable issues that he plans to raise outside the scope of 
       the previous motion to dismiss the indictment. 
 
[Id. at 2, P 6.] Miller's appointed appellate counsel filed only 
an opening brief on his client's behalf. In it, he abandoned 
Miller's contention that perjured testimony was used 
against him at the grand jury hearing. Instead, he raised an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, asserting that 
Miller's counsel prejudiced him in failing to advise him that 
he would be sentenced as a career offender. 
 
The government makes two arguments in response. First, 
it contends that Miller's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
argument is time barred. Second, it submits that even if the 






The first question before us is whether the District Court 
properly characterized Miller's two post-conviction motions 
as 28 U.S.C. S 2255 motions.1 In addressing this question, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In its initial brief, the government assumed that the District Court 
had 
correctly recharacterized Miller's post-conviction motions as one S 2255 
motion.  Miller's counsel's initial briefing on this issue was inadequate. 
We instructed both parties to submit letter memoranda addressing the 
recharacterization issue, which is an important issue of judicial 
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we note at the outset that "federal courts have long 
recognized that they have an obligation to look behind the 
label of a motion filed by a pro se inmate and determine 
whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under a 
different remedial statutory framework." United States v. 
Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624-25 (11th Cir. 1990). This 
obligation stems from the time-honored practice of 
construing pro se plaintiffs' pleadings liberally. See, e.g., 
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) ("[A]llegations 
such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully 
pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer 
supporting evidence"); Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 694 (3d 
Cir. 1992) ("When . . . plaintiff is a pro se litigant, we have 
a special obligation to construe his complaint liberally."). 
 
In keeping with these obligations, district courts have 
"routinely converted post conviction motions of prisoners 
who unsuccessfully sought relief under some other 
provision of law into motions made under 28 U.S.C.S 2255 
and proceeded to determine whether the prisoner was 
entitled to relief under that statute." Adams v. United 
States, 155 F.3d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1998).2 Courts engaged 
in this practice in order to reach the merits of pro se 
petitions, while avoiding the wasted time and expense of 
forcing petitioners to redraft their pleadings. Several courts 
of appeals, including this one, have endorsed this approach 
as fair and efficient. See, e.g., Tedford v. Hepting, 990 F.2d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
administration and public interest in light of AEDPA, and they have 
argued their respective positions effectively. Thus, we can properly reach 
the issue. See Hatley v. Lockhart, 990 F.2d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 1993) 
("we have discretion to consider issues not raised in the briefs, 
`particularly where substantial public interests are involved' ") 
(citation 
omitted); see also United States v. Babwah, 972 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 
1992) (finding it appropriate to reach an issue not raised by defendant's 
counsel on appeal, in part because the government was afforded an 
opportunity to argue the issue and would not be prejudiced by the 
court's decision to reach it). 
 
2. Section 2255 provides those convicted in federal courts with a means 
by which to bring collateral attacks challenging the validity of their 
judgment and sentence. See 28 U.S.C. S 2255. The section "was intended 
to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas 
corpus." Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). 
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745, 749-50 (3d Cir. 1993) (treating S 1983 claim as 
petition for writ of habeas corpus when validity of plaintiff's 
criminal conviction was necessarily at issue); United States 
v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 625 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(recharacterizing Rule 35 motion as S 2255 motion). 
 
The District Court's recharacterization of Miller's two 
post-conviction motions comports with the above- 
mentioned practices. Miller alleged that he discovered new 
evidence of perjured grand jury testimony that undermined 
both his conviction and the indictment against him. As do 
many pro se petitioners, however, Miller failed to state 
these claims in a manner consistent with the federal rules 
of criminal and appellate procedure. Miller's FED. R. CRIM. P. 
33 motion for a new trial based on the evidence of perjured 
testimony was procedurally barred.3 And his attempt to 
"nullify" his conviction by filing his "Motion to Dismiss the 
Underlying Indictment" suffered from similar procedural 
defects; there is no general right, other than on collateral 
attack, to challenge a conviction or indictment after the 
defendant pleads guilty. See Tedford v. Hepting, 990 F.2d 
745, 748 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that it is "clear that if a 
prisoner challenges `the fact or length of confinement,' then 
his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus,SS 28 




Had AEDPA not been enacted, the District Court's 
handling of Miller's motions in this case would pose no 
problem. AEDPA, however, dramatically altered the form 
and timing of habeas petitions filed in the federal courts. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. "By its express terms, Rule 33 is confined to those situations in which 
a trial has been had." United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 78 (1st Cir. 
1995). In this case, Miller pled guilty to the conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine charge. He thus waived his right to a trial and his right to 
petition for a new trial. See id. ("A defendant who enters a guilty plea 
cannot thereafter use Rule 33 as a wedge to undo his acknowledgment 
that he committed the offense.") (citing United States v. Collins, 898 
F.2d 
103, 104 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); United States v. Lambert, 603 F.2d 
808, 809 (10th Cir. 1979); Williams v. United States, 290 F.2d 217, 218 
(5th Cir. 1961) (per curiam)). 
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Section 2255, as amended by AEDPA, bars second or 
successive habeas petitions absent exceptional 
circumstances and certification by the appropriate court of 
appeals. See Pub. L. 104-132, Title I, S 105, 110 Stat. 1220 
(1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. S 2255 (West Supp. 1999)). 
Amended sections 2255 and 2244(d)(1), moreover, impose a 
one-year statute of limitation on applications for writ of 
habeas corpus. See id.; see also Pub. L. 104-132, Title I, 
S 101, 106 Stat. 1217, 1220 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. 
S 2244(d)(1) (West Supp. 1999)). Habeas petitioners must 
therefore be careful to avoid the twin procedural bars that 
AEDPA has created. To avoid making successive claims, 
petitioners must marshal in one S 2255 writ all the 
arguments they have to collaterally attack their convictions. 
And in order to avoid being time barred, they must take 
care to file this one all-inclusive petition within one year of 
the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes 
final. Cf. infra note 9 (describing the date on which Miller's 
judgment of conviction became final). 
 
With AEDPA in place, the practice of liberally construing 
post-conviction motions as S 2255 petitions can, in the 
absence of cautionary or educational measures, impair the 
ability of inmates to challenge their convictions on collateral 
review. If each pro se post-conviction filing is treated as a 
S 2255 writ, as was once the case, inept petitioners face 
losing potentially valid constitutional claims at the hands of 
judges who are applying a rule of liberal construction that 
was created to benefit pro se claimants. This odd result has 
not gone unnoticed by federal courts. The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit recently addressed this post-AEDPA 
anomaly in Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582 (2d Cir. 
1998) (per curiam). 
 
Adams, an inmate acting pro se, had filed a post- 
conviction Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss, which the 
district court unilaterally recharacterized as aS 2255 
motion. See id. at 582-83. Adams objected to this 
reconstruction and asked to withdraw the motion rather 
than have it so recharacterized because he intended to file 
"all his habeas claims in a single later [S 2255] motion." Id. 
at 583. The district court refused this request and 
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dismissed Adams's claim on its merits. See id. On review, 
the court of appeals held that the common practice of 
automatically treating post-conviction motions as S 2255 
motions should be abandoned. The court wrote, "The 
[district] court's act of conversion which we approved of 
under pre-AEDPA law because it was useful and harmless 
might, under AEDPA's new law, become extraordinarily 
harmful to prisoner's rights." Id. at 583-84. "A prisoner 
convicted pursuant to unconstitutional proceedings," the 
court continued, "might lose the right to have a single 
petition for habeas corpus adjudicated, solely by reason of 
a district court's having incorrectly recharacterized some 
prior motion as one brought under S 2255." Id. at 584. 
 
To avoid this unfairness, and consistent with the above- 
mentioned practices of assisting pro se petitioners, the 
court concluded that district courts must apprise 
petitioners of the consequences of their petitions before the 
district court can make a S 2255 recharacterization. See id. 
at 583-84. The court articulated the means by which a 
district court would give a pro se petitioner such notice: 
 
       [D]istrict courts should not recharacterize a motion 
       purportedly made under some other rule as a motion 
       made under S 2255 unless (a) the movant, with 
       knowledge of the potential adverse consequences of 
       such recharacterization, agrees to have the motion so 
       recharacterized, or (b) the court finds that, 
       notwithstanding its designation, the motion should be 
       considered as made under S 2255 because of the 
       nature of the relief sought, and offers the movant the 
       opportunity to withdraw the motion rather than have it 
       so recharacterized.  
 
Id. at 584 (emphasis added). 
 
Not finding either of these two preconditions met in 
Adams's case, the court of appeals vacated the district 
court's decision to treat Adams's Rule 12(b)(2) motion as a 
S 2255 motion. See id. at 582-84. The court reasoned that 
the district court neither had "obtained Adams's informed 
consent" to deem his post-conviction motion aS 2255 
motion, nor had it given Adams the opportunity to 
withdraw the motion rather than have it so recharacterized. 
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Id. at 584. The court held that Adams should be given the 
opportunity to file a S 2255 motion. Given that Adams 
would have had several months under AEDPA's one-year 
statute of limitation to file his S 2255 motion when the 
district court entered its order, the court further held that 
the statute of limitations would be tolled, as "fairness 
demands," in order to "afford Adams an opportunity to file 
his first S 2255 motion, provided that he do so promptly." 
Id. at 584 n.2. In so holding, the court counseled that 
future district courts giving the Adams admonitions must 
be sensitive to the one-year statute of limitations for habeas 
petitions. See id. 
 
Were the Adams test to apply here, the same result 
would obtain. The District Court dismissed Miller's two 
petitions without asking the government to submit a 
response and without holding a hearing at which Miller was 
present. Thus, without the benefit of Adams 's two-part 
notice requirement, Miller had neither the opportunity to 
"agree" or "disagree" that his pro se motions be 
recharacterized as a single S 2255 motion, see id. at 584, 
nor the "opportunity to withdraw the motion rather than 
have it so recharacterized." Adams, 155 F.3d at 584.4 As 
these options were not presented to Miller, Adams would 
demand vacating and remanding the case to allow Miller to 
file what he intended as his original and completeS 2255 
motion. 
 
Only one other court of appeals appears to have 
addressed the post-AEDPA claim recharacterization issue 
raised by Adams.5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Courts in the Second Circuit have begun giving inmates, acting pro se, 
such notice. See., e.g., United States v. Moore, 1999 WL 377258, *1 (2d 
Cir. June 1, 1999) (referring to petitioner's "options" in the " `Adams 
inquiry' "); Warren v. Garvin, No. 97-C3242, 1999 WL 494117, at *5 n.6 
(S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1999) (discussing the "Adams admonition"). 
 
5. We note that a district court in our circuit purported to follow the 
Adams rule, but seems to have misapplied it. See United States v. 
Hawkins, No. CRIM. A. 93-221-01, 1998 WL 804729, at *6 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 19, 1998). In Hawkins, the district court recharacterized Hawkins's 
post-conviction petition as a S 2255 motion and, citing Adams, 
recognized the problems in doing so in light of AEDPA. See id. at *6-7. 
However, after saying as much, the district court failed to "offer" 
Hawkins the "opportunity to withdraw [his] motion rather than have it so 
recharacterized," as Adams requires. Adams, 155 F.3d at 584. 
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Circuit, albeit uncritically, seems to have taken the 
opposite approach to the problem. In In re Tolliver, 97 F.3d 
89 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), petitioner requested that 
the court of appeals issue an order authorizing him to file 
a successive S 2255 claim. The court endorsed the district 
court's unilateral decision to recharacterize Tolliver's 
previous pro se motion as a S 2255 motion and held that, 
since Tolliver had filed such a motion, any successive 
S 2255 motion he filed needed to be certified by a court of 
appeals. In reaching this holding, the court said nothing 
about the fairness concerns raised in Adams regarding 
such unilateral recharacterizations or AEDPA's impact on 
the general practice of construing pro se petitioners' 
pleading liberally. 
 
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Tolliver is so brief and 
without elaboration that it is hard to use it as a foil to 
challenge the result in Adams. To be fair to our sister 
court, Tolliver was decided two years before Adams and 
almost immediately after AEDPA's enactment. The Fifth 
Circuit did not have the benefit of Adams's discussion, and 
it does not appear that the Adams argument was raised. 
Faced directly with this argument, the Tolliver  court might 
have decided otherwise, or at the very least explained away 
the fairness concerns discussed at length in Adams. 
 
At all events, we find Adams persuasive. First, we 
recognize that the practice of recharacterizing pro se post- 
conviction motions as S 2255 motions developed, in part, as 
an attempt to be fair to habeas petitioners. See Adams, 155 
F.3d at 583-84; see also Section II.A, supra.6 The line of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. A good example of this practice is a case from the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, decided before the enactment of AEDPA, which 
recognized the fairness concerns at issue in deciding whether or not to 
recharacterize pro se post-conviction pleadings. In United States v. 
Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 291 (10th Cir. 1994), the court declined to 
construe petitioner's Rule 32 motion as a S 2255 motion because the 
petitioner did not intend the motion to be so construed, and more 
importantly, "because if it was so construed," a "latter petition raising 
new issues attacking the sentence would be subject to challenge as 
successive." The court's attention to the rule that pro se pleadings be 
construed in the pro se petitioner's favor, see id. at 290, compelled it 
to 
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pro-se-petitioner-friendly cases endorsing liberal 
recharacterizations should not be applied woodenly in such 
a way as to deprive habeas petitioners of their only 
opportunity to seek collateral relief. Second, the Adams 
approach seems legitimately to advance Congress's 
purposes in enacting AEDPA in a way that the Tolliver 
approach does not. AEDPA was intended to codify the 
judicial doctrine of abuse of writ. See Felkner v. Turpin, 518 
U.S. 651, 664 (1996). This codified abuse of writ rule does 
not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 661-64. 
Rather, it effectively creates a "modified res judicata rule," 
which prevents petitioners from relitigating habeas claims 
absent exceptional circumstances. See id. at 664; id. at 657 
(describing the court of appeals "gatekeeping" role in the 
certification of successive claims process). The Adams 
approach comports with AEDPA's gatekeeping mechanisms 
by forcing federal inmates to litigate all of their collateral 
claims in one S 2555 hearing--either at the time the motion 
is first filed or when it is first refiled after the Adams notice 
and within the statutory time limit. 
 
Under the Tolliver approach, district courts would be free 
to construe unilaterally a petitioner's first post-conviction 
pleading as his S 2255 writ, effectively barring all future 
writs except in the rare circumstances set out inS 2255. 
Although Tolliver similarly forces the habeas action into one 
hearing, this one all-important hearing would often be 
meaningless because the petitioner would not have set 
forth all his potentially valid constitutional claims. Put 
differently, the Tolliver rule can act as a trap for unwary 
petitioners who do not know that a single post-conviction 
motion might bar an intended habeas writ. This result is 
contrary to the notion that AEDPA's "modified res judicata 
rule" and "gatekeeping" mechanism are directed toward 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
avoid a S 2255 recharacterization that only potentially would have barred 
a successive appeal under the pre-AEDPA incarnation of S 2255. To 
make such a recharacterization when doing so virtually guarantees that 
a successive petition would be barred, see Tolliver, 97 F.3d at 90 
(denying Tolliver's motion for certification of appealability under the 
new 
AEDPA appealability standard), seems contrary to the practice of liberal 
construction. 
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"screening" previously litigated issues, see Felkner, 518 
U.S. at 662, 664, not toward foreclosing a petitioner's 
ability to raise all potential arguments in a single claim. 
 
Persuaded by the Adams approach, we conclude that 
district courts should discontinue their practice of 
automatically treating pro se, post-conviction motions as 
S 2255 petitions. Rather, upon receipt of pro se pleadings 
challenging an inmate's conviction or 
incarceration--whether styled as a S 2255 motion or not--a 
district court should issue a notice to the petitioner 
regarding the effect of his pleadings. This notice should 
advise the petitioner that he can (1) have his motion ruled 
upon as filed; (2) have his motion recharacterized as a 
S 2255 motion and heard as such, but lose his ability to file 
successive petitions absent certification by the court of 
appeals; or (3) withdraw the petition, and file one all- 
inclusive S 2255 petition within the one-year statutory 
period. We strongly suggest that the District Court provide, 
in its notice, that the prose petitioner has 45 days from the 
date of the notice to provide the District Court with a 
response.7 
 
The rule we announce is prospective (and also narrow). 
For example, a pro se petitioner who filed a pre-AEDPA 
pleading, which was recast as a S 2255 motion, is bound by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We anticipate that in some cases the petitioner will fail to respond at 
all to this form notice or fail to respond within the prescribed time. In 
such instances, the District Court should rule on the pleadings before it, 
as captioned. 
 
We also observe that the same problem may arise in connection with 
a filing by a pro se state petitioner. Although the issue is not before 
us, 
we observe that a district court might see fit to take similar 
prophylactic 
steps before recharacterizing such a filing as a petition for habeas 
corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, because, under AEDPA, state prisoners 
face similar restrictions on filing second or successive petitions. Cf. 
Copus v. City of Edgerton, 96 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) 
("The district court [is] not authorized to convert a S 1983 action into a 
S 2254 action, a step that carries disadvantages (exhaustion and the 
certificate of appealability only two among many) for litigants . . . . 
When 
a plaintiff files a S 1983 action that cannot be resolved without 
inquiring 
into the validity of confinement, the court should dismiss the suit 
without prejudice."). 
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the provisions of AEDPA regarding second or successive 
petitions. Our holdings in In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3d 
Cir. 1999), and United States v. Roberson,__ F.3d __, No. 
97-7309, 1999 WL 825544 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 1999), which 
require examination of pre-AEDPA abuse of writ principles 
in such circumstances, offer petitioners sufficient 
protection against unconstitutional retroactive application 




Because the District Court in this case unilaterally 
recharacterized Miller's post-conviction motions as a S 2255 
motion despite Miller's subsequent objection, we will vacate 
the Court's order and remand the case so that Miller may 
make all of his collateral arguments in a singleS 2255 
motion.8 AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations would 
normally bar the filing of a S 2255 petition at this late date, 
some two years after the judgment of conviction became 
final on September 14, 1997.9 However, as Miller filed his 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 motion and motion to dismiss on August 
11, 1997--more than a month before the statute even 
began to run on September 14, 1997--he would have had 
more than ample time to withdraw those motions, recast 
them, and include them with other arguments in a timely 
S 2255 motion. Therefore, as in Adams, we will toll the 
statute of limitations to afford Miller his opportunity to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We do not speculate what these claims might be, pass on their merits, 
or render judgment on the ones that Miller and his counsel advanced in 
the present appeal. 
 
9. The statute began to run in Miller's case on the date "judgment of 
conviction bec[ame] final." 28 U.S.C.A. S 2255. This Court rejected 
Miller's direct appeal on June 16, 1997. See United States v. Miller, No. 
96-7610 (3d Cir. June 16, 1997). As Miller did notfile a petition for writ 
of certiorari with the Supreme Court, judgment became final and the 
one-year statute of limitations began to run on the date on which Miller's 
"time for filing a timely petition for certiorari review expire[d]." 
Kapral v. 
United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999). Supreme Court Rule 13 
provides that a timely petition for certiorari review must be filed within 
ninety days after the entry of judgment by a United States court of 
appeals. Here, that would be ninety days after June 16, 1997, or 
September 14, 1997. 
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refile his habeas petition. See Adams, 155 F.3d at 584 n.2. 
He should do so within 120 days or be barred from 
reconsideration. 
 
The government argues that permitting such a petition at 
this late date would run afoul of our recent decision in 
United States v Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 1999 WL 426458 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999) (refusing, 
in light of AEDPA, to allow an amendment to a S 2255 
petition after the S 2255 one-year statute of limitations had 
run, when the proposed amendment raised a new claim 
arising out of a different set of facts and the facts 
supporting the claim were available to the petitioner at the 
time of his original filing). This case is simply different in 
kind. In Duffus, the petitioner styled his original complaint 
as a S 2255 motion and then tried more than a year later 
to amend it to include additional claims. No unilateral act 
on the part of the district court prevented Duffus from 
raising all of his S 2255 claims in a timely manner. 
Therefore, he was responsible for not raising all the 
arguments he had to make in his original S 2255 petition 
and was rightly barred by S 2255's one-year statute of 
limitations. 
 
Here, Miller seeks to file his original S 2255 complaint, 
making all of his collateral claims at once, but the District 
Court's sua sponte decision to recharacterize his post- 
conviction motions has precluded him from doing so. 
Unlike the petitioner in Duffus, Miller wanted to and would 
have raised all of his S 2255 arguments in a timely fashion, 
but for the District Court's intervention. Miller is not 
attempting, like the petitioner in Duffus, to amend a long- 
ago filed S 2255 motion; he is trying tofile his initial 
petition. Therefore, he is not making an end run around 
S 2255's one-year statute of limitation--as would have the 
petitioner Duffus if allowed to amend his complaint--and 
we do not need to bar his claim to protect the integrity of 
Congress's decision to enact S 2255. See id. at 337-38. 
 
For similar reasons, our decision to toll the statute of 
limitations to afford Miller the opportunity tofile his S 2255 
petition comports with our recent decision in Jones v. 
Morton, __ F.3d __, No. 98-5230, 1999 WL 970797 (3d Cir. 
Oct. 25, 1999). In Jones, we refused to equitably toll 
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AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations when the petitioner 
made no showing of unfairness, e.g., that he diligently 
pursued his claims and that he was prevented, in some 
extraordinary way, from asserting his rights. See id. at *5-6. 
Here, Miller immediately protested the District Court's 
decision to recharacterize his post-conviction motions as a 
S 2255 motion, and it was the District Court's unilateral act 
that prevented Miller from filing his intendedS 2255 motion 
in a timely fashion. To quote Jones, Miller's appeal is one 
of the " `rare situations where equitable tolling is demanded 
by sound legal principles as well as the interests of 
justice.' " Id. at *5 (citations omitted). If in the future, a 
district court failed to provide the necessary warnings 
proscribed in this opinion, the statute of limitations should 
similarly be tolled to allow the petitioner an opportunity to 
file all of his claims in the correct manner. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District Court 
will be vacated and the case remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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